The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in Brima, Kamara and Kanu recognized that forced marriages may amount to crimes against humanity, falling under the sub-heading of 'other inhumane acts'. This decision is to be welcomed because the practice of forced marriage is not adequately described by existing categories of sexual crimes. As forced conjugality results in particular psychological and moral suffering for the victims, it is argued that this heinous practice may be more appropriately pursued as a separate crime, under a definition that describes the entirety and complexity of the criminal conduct. The SCSL decision may also be important for its impact on the activities of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The widespread practice of forced marriage presently features in all the situations being investigated by the ICC and the inclusion in the ICC Statute of the offence of forced marriage as a separate crime against humanity could be discussed during the Review Conference in 2009.
Introductory Remarks
The Appeals Chamber Judgment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in Brima, Kamara and Kanu 1 is noteworthy primarily for two reasons. In this landmark decision, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber's decision to convict the appellants for the war crime of conscripting, enlisting and using children under the age of 15 years 2 to participate in hostilities. 3 In addition more importantly for the purpose of this comment, the Appeals Chamber recognized for the first time in the history of international criminal tribunals, that forced marriage mayamount to crimes against humanity under customary international law, fitting in the sub-category of 'other inhumane acts'. These two aspects of the decision are important in the progressive development of international criminal law. However, as some commentators have already argued, in other respects, this decision is also a missed opportunity having failed to adequately dwell on some crucial legal issues raised by the case. 4 This short comment will only discuss the legal findings concerning the characterization of forced marriage as a crime against humanity. Arguably this is the main contribution of this decision to the development of international criminal law and might have a bearing both on future cases of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 5 as well as on the imminent revision of the ICC Statute itself, with a view of including a 'new' crime against humanity. In the case at hand, the Prosecution had charged the defendants with the practice of forced marriage under Article 2(i) of the SCSL Statute which provides for the sub-category of 'other inhumane acts' in the definition of crimes against humanity. The Trial Chamber dismissed the count finding that the charge was redundant as the trial judges argued that the Prosecutor was not able to prove that forced marriage is significantly different from the crime of sexual slavery. The Trial Chamber therefore held that there was no lacuna to be filled through the recognition of the separate crime of forced marriage. . However, as widely reported, on 2 July 2008 a Trial Chamber of the ICC ordered the release of Thomas Lubanga. The Prosecution apparently had evidence in its possession that had not been seen by the Defence. The judges determined that this made a free and fair trial impossible. The accused will remain under custody of the ICC pending the final decision on the appeal filed by the Prosecution. 4 As it has been observed 'The Appeals Judgment may represent a missed opportunity for the SCSL's highest judicial organ. This perspective perceives that the Appeals Chamber failed to leave a clear imprint on significant legal issues that resonate beyond the SCSL's courtrooms. For example, the Appeals Chamber (i) failed to assess the fair trial implications of its findings on JCE (Joint Criminal Enterprise) liability and forced marriage vis-a' -vis the rights of the appellants to know the case against them; (ii) summarily dismissed the argument by Brima regarding the important doctrine of equality of arms; (iii) showed instrumentalist reasoning in deciding the 'greatest responsibility' question; and (iv) failed to flesh out the elements of the crime of conscripting, enlisting or using children in armed conflict, especially given their importance to the first case before the ICC', C.C. Jalloh and J. At present, there is therefore a variety of categories of sexual or gender-related crimes in international criminal law under which the criminal behaviour of alleged perpetrators may be pursued. It must also be noted that thanks to the case law of international criminal tribunals, some of the crimes that originated as gender-based can be considered to fall in non-sexual categories. By way of example, depending on the circumstances rape can amount to torture. 9 In light of the many categories of crimes by which defendants may be charged for grave sexual or gender-related criminal acts, one may wonder whether forced marriage needs to be prosecuted as a separate crime. In the view of the Appeals Chamber, forced marriage should be seen as a separate crime because of the specificity of this practice in the context of the Sierra 7 Ibid. 8 See Art. 2, SCSLSt.: 'The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population: a) Murder; b) Extermination; c) Enslavement; d) Deportation; e) Imprisonment; f) Torture; g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence; h) Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; i) Other inhuman acts'. 9 Judgment, Furundz› ija (IT-95-17/1), Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, xx163^164: 'Rape is resorted to either by the interrogator himself or by other persons associated with the interrogation of a detainee, as a means of punishing, intimidating, coercing or humiliating the victim, or obtaining information, or a confession, from the victim or a third person. In human rights law, in such situations the rape may amount to torture'.
Leonean civil conflict. 10 However, the question must be carefully considered as it would be a waste of judicial resources to introduce a new crime and to penalize a criminal conduct that could be prosecuted exactly in the same manner under an already existing category.
A number of factors tip the scale in favour of the need of introducing the new sub-category of forced marriage as a crime against humanity. First, forced marriage, as described not only by the victims but also by numerous experts who were asked to give their opinion on this practice, is a multi-layered crime. It may involve rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, forced domestic labour, that taken individually may all amount to crimes against humanity. However, the practice of forced marriage as it was extensively carried out in Sierra Leone is not fully described by any of the single crimes enumerated in the SCSL Statute. Forced marriage is more that the sum of its components.
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More specifically, forced marriage may be distinguished from sexual slavery, the category where it was subsumed by the Trial Chamber. Sexual slavery was first recognized as a separate crime against humanity in 1998, when it was inserted in the ICC Statute. In fact, the drafters considered that sexual slavery differed from other crimes already existing such as enslavement and enforced prostitution and they deemed that sexual slavery represented more than the sum of its constitutive elements.
12 There is actually no other case law on sexual slavery ç this case against the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) before the SCSL being the first one to deal with this count ç that could help to better refine the contours of this crime. 13 The judges of the Trial Chamber made reference to the ICC EofC, 14 that contain a very detailed elaboration of the crime of sexual slavery. According to the EofC, leaving aside the elements in common to all crimes against humanity sexual slavery occurs where 'The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the 10 The Appeals Chamber found relevant differences between forced marriage and sexual slavery and concluded that: '(. . .) in the context of the Sierra Leone conflict, forced marriage describes a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury to the victim' , see Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 1, x183. . 14 The crimes of sexual slavery is not defined in the SCSL Statute, however, the trial judges made explicit reference to the ICC EofC, see SCSL, Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 6, xx708^709.
right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty' and 'caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature'. However, the elements of crime of sexual slavery does not include the imposition of marital status inflicted on the so-called 'bush-wives', whereas at close scrutiny the element of 'forced conjugality' ç which implies the expectation of a whole variety of sexual and nonsexual tasks to be performed ç actually seems to be the distinctive feature of this heinous criminal conduct. 15 In addition, it must be stressed that forced marriage represents a vilification of a highly symbolic social and religious institution, as attested by the fact that even when committed as a single act it has been repeatedly condemned as a human rights violation and is prohibited by many relevant human rights instruments. 16 For all these reasons, forced marriage involves specific elements of psychological and moral suffering, not 'only' of sexual exploitation or abuse, and it seems appropriate that it is pursued as a separate crime, under a definition that describes the entirety and complexity of the criminal conduct.
In this respect, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL rose to the challenge of moving forward international criminal law for it considered and refined the definition of forced marriage reaching the conclusion to class it as a discrete crime. This development seems to be all the more appropriate, in light of the fact that the practice of forced marriage has reportedly been carried out on a widespread basis ç that is to say in very similar terms to those of Sierra Leone ç in many other countries. As universally recognized, an individual may not be prosecuted for acts that were not characterized as crimes at the time when they were committed.
15 The so called 'bush wives' were abducted, assigned to a combatant and forced to follow him to the rebel camp. They must be completely at their 'husband's' disposal both sexually and in performing a variety of domestic tasks such as cooking, washing, cleaning, carrying looted items. They were expected to be loyal and faithful to their 'husbands', and to keep and raise their children. Nonetheless, they were often abandoned when the captors got tired of them. The fact of being abandoned could also worsen their situation because the majority of 'ex-wives' were rejected by their communities and found themselves with no means of survival for them and their children. The principle of legality, also expressed by the Latin formula nullum crimen sine lege, guards the defendant against this. 18 However, national and international courts are entitled to elaborate on existing rules and to refine them by way of legal construction. This is true in particular for international criminal law, which is to a large extent judge-made law.
In the case at hand, forced marriage was considered as a crime against humanity falling in the 'other inhumane acts' category. Such a sub-category has been always inserted in the Statutes of international criminal tribunals 19 with the main purpose of ensuring the possibility to prosecute forms of crimes against humanity not explicitly spelled out. 20 This category was originally drafted as a residual one and consistently remained vague. 21 However, recent ICTY case law shed some light on the possible means to interpret the type of conduct which may fall under 'other inhuman acts'. In particular, in Kupres› kic¤ the Trial Chamber found that useful parameters for interpretation may be identified in international standards on human rights such as those laid down in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 and the two United Nations Covenants on Human Rights of 1966. With reference to those standards (and to those contained in other numerous human rights instruments), the ICTY found that 'it is possible to identify a set of basic rights appertaining to human beings, the infringement of which may amount, depending on the accompanying circumstances, to a crime against humanity'. 22 In addition, the crimes must be as serious as the other crimes provided in the category of crimes against humanity. The comparable gravity may be ascertained through the eiusdem generis rule. Such an interpretation is also confirmed by the wording of the ICC Statute that prescribes 'other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to the body or to mental or physical health'. 23 Finally, the crime must satisfy the general elements of crimes against humanity, that is to say, it must have been committed in the framework of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population and with knowledge of the attack on the part of the perpetrator. In sum, the evaluation of the type of criminal conduct x 165: 'To assess the seriousness of an act, consideration must be given to all the factual circumstances. These circumstances may include the nature of the act or omission, the context in which it occurred, the personal circumstances of the victim including age, sex and health, as well as the physical, mental and moral effects of the act upon the victim. ' that may be classed amongst 'other inhumane acts' must be done on a case-bycase basis.
24
According to these legal standards, forced marriage should undoubtedly be included in the 'other inhumane acts'category. First, forced marriage is prohibited by many relevant human rights instruments. One may note Article 16 of the UDHR, 25 and Article 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which provides 'No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses'. The most comprehensive rule forbidding forced marriage is contained in Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 26 A similar rule is inserted in regional human rights conventions. According to these various treaties, the single act of forcing someone into a marriage relationship is a serious violation of her (or his) fundamental rights. Obviously, these instruments express forced marriage as a violation of human rights and not as a criminal offence. However, it must be stressed that forced marriage is considered to be a crime today in many national systems. 27 In addition, forced marriage committed in the context of an armed conflict and on a massive scale, has already been taken into consideration and repeatedly condemned by various human rights bodies. 28 24 With respect to the ICC Statute, the appropriate element to include this 'new crime' would indeed be Art. 7(1)(k) (other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing . . .) and not Art. 7(1)(g) ('any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity') precisely because forced marriage includes both sexual and non-sexual elements. 25 Art. 16 provides '(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. Moreover, the gravity of forced marriage as carried out in the context of the Sierra Leone an civil conflict is analogous to that of other crimes against humanity committed in the same circumstances. As mentioned above, the constitutive elements of forced marriage as perpetrated in Sierra Leone amount per se to crimes against humanity, that is to say that the seriousness of the crime may be assessed beyond any doubt. It must also be underlined that a factor to be evaluated when assessing the gravity of the crimes is also the age of the victim and the effects of the crimes on the victim. Unfortunately, the victims of forced marriage are too often very young girls whose physical and moral suffering is unbearable.
29 Another aspect to be taken into account when assessing the gravity of this practice is that forced marriage is a continuous offence, lasting until the 'husband' gets tired of his 'wife' meaning that the situation may endure for several years. 30 Finally, the crime of forced marriage meets the requirements of accessibility and foreseeability that have been developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to evaluate if criminal rules are in keeping with the principle of non-retroactivity of the law. As noted above, forced marriage as a crime against humanity consists of multiple elements that could individually amount to crimes against humanity. One may therefore assume that the alleged perpetrators knew that their conduct was criminal and should expect to be prosecuted. At the very least it would be incongruous that the perpetrator of one or more of these acts expects not to be prosecuted because they were carried out under the guise of 'marriage'.
The above conclusion on non-retroactivity should not undermine the importance of prosecuting forced marriage as a separate crime, since its most typical feature, precisely the imposition of forced conjugality, distinguishes it from other conducts that are 'only' sexual crimes. The practice of forced marriage was well documented also during the civil conflict and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, but the crime was not included in the ICTR Statute. While the ICTR gave an important contribution to the definition of sexual and gender-based crimes, it did not prosecute forced marriages as such. The suggestion to charge forced marriage as a crime of sexual violence and to amend the ICTR Statute was, however, already put forward by some scholars. 31 The more recent SCSL Appeals judgment delivered in Brima which recognized forced marriage as a crime against humanity might influence the cases now before the ICC. In March 2008, Radhika Coomaraswamy, UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, presented a written submission, 32 as amicus curiae, to the ICC judges advising them on how to interpret the charges against Thomas Lubanga, head of the Union of Congolese Patriots, indicted by the ICC. She recommended that the crime of using children to 'participate actively' in hostilities should be understood to include the sexual violence suffered by girls forced to join Lubanga's militia (arguably these girls were forced to become 'bush-wives'). 33 In addition, as mentioned above, forced marriages have been extensively carried out by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda 34 and similar practices are reported in the Central African Republic and in Darfur. 35 In 2009, the UN Secretary-General of the United Nations is to convene the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute that will consider possible amendments to the Statute itself. While the programme of the Review Conference has not been set it is highly likely that the crime of aggression will constitute one of the main issues on the agenda. The Rome Conference recommended in 1998 the possible consideration of terrorism and drug crimes and these issues will also be extensively debated at the Review Conference. However, it is also possible that some other amendments such as the insertion of the crime of forced marriage amongst crimes against humanity could be considered. This would be the crucial step to allow the ICC to formally prosecute forced marriage as a discrete crime, as the gravity of this practice suggests, in order to adequately punish those responsible. . 36 Finally, it should also be noted that the UN Security Council recently adopted a resolution condemning rape and all forms of sexual violence against women. In paragraph 1 of the Resolution, the Council: 'Stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, affirms in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and expresses its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence', UN Doc. S/RES 1820, 19 June 2008.
